A Frustrating Argument about Abortion: Part 2
You can find part 1 of this article here. This article will continue looking at Kate Greasley’s critique of the book, Embryo, by Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen. In Part 2, I will explain certain parts of her books and offer critiques as I go. Ghosts in the Machine? Greasley explains that, "George and Tollefsen believe that their task here is to refute the dualist conception of persons–the view that 'we' are ghostly substances inhabiting human machines… This is because of what they take dualism to imply about the conditions for persisting identity. If 'we' are basically immaterial substances, it seems that we would come and go from our human bodies, and, consequently, that we are not identical with those bodies." (1) This part is actually accurate. As I showed in part 1, they are trying to refute dualism, or the idea that we are something other than our bodies. Moreover, they also claim that if we are some immaterial substance of the person kind, that inhabits our bodies, it would open up…